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This paper addresses the allocation of defensive or hardening resources in an electric power grid to
mitigate the vulnerability against multiple contingencies. This planning problem is characterized by a
defender-attacker-defender model which is formulated as a trilevel programming problem. In the upper
level, the system planner identifies the components to be defended or hardened in order to reduce the
damage associated with plausible outages. In the middle level, the disruptive agent determines the set of
out-of-service components so that the damage in the system is maximized. Finally, in the lower level, the
system operator minimizes the damage caused by the outages selected by the disruptive agent by means
of an optimal operation of the power system. We propose a novel two-stage solution approach that
attains optimality with moderate computational effort. The original trilevel program is first transformed
into an equivalent bilevel program, which is subsequently solved by an efficient implicit enumeration
algorithm. Numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed methodology.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Power systems have become fundamental for the development of
national economies worldwide [1–3]. As any other critical infrastruc-
ture, power systems are subject to disruptions, either unintentional
or deliberate, that may have a significant impact on their perfor-
mance. The vulnerability of power systems has been uncovered by
recent blackouts in industrialized countries [4–7]. Moreover, these
catastrophic events have revealed that traditional security assess-
ment tools such as the N-1 and N-2 criteria [8] are insufficient to
cope with multiple contingencies. Therefore, it is of utmost impor-
tance to devise new tools to guarantee the correct operation of
power systems even under the most adverse, conceivable situations.
As a consequence, research effort is required with two main goals:
(i) to study the vulnerability of power systems, and (ii) to determine
strategies to mitigate such vulnerability.
The first goal has been extensively addressed through the
development of attacker-defender models for both intentional
[9–16] and unintentional outages [17–19]. Attacker-defender mod-
els allow identifying the critical components in a power system,
i.e., those assets whose outage would yield the maximum damagell rights reserved.
y of Science of Spain, under
n Commission, under Grant
+34 926 295361.
uacil),to the system. These models are instances of bilevel programming
[20,21] that have been solved by decomposition-based approaches
inspired by Benders decomposition [9,14–16], equivalent transfor-
mations to mixed-integer programs [10–12,17,18], and approxi-
mate methods [13,19].
In contrast to vulnerability analysis, little attention has been paid
to the vulnerability mitigation of power systems. According to [2,3],
several strategies for vulnerability reduction can be implemented
such as (i) adding new assets for purposes of redundancy, and (ii)
hardening the infrastructure or improving its active defenses so that
the hardened or defended assets become invulnerable. Hardening
and defense actions may include appropriate surveillance measures,
patrolling localized assets, and undergrounding specific transmis-
sion components. For exposition purposes, terms related to defense
and hardening are used interchangeably hereinafter.
The determination of optimal strategies for vulnerability mitigation
is essentially a planning problem where investment decisions are
made to either build new assets or reinforce existing ones. Moreover,
these planning decisions take into account the occurrence of outages
similarly to contingency-constrained planning models [22].
With respect to adding redundancy in a power system, trans-
mission network expansion planning was proposed in [23–25] as
an effective tool to mitigate the impact of deliberate outages on
the performance of the transmission network. Regarding power
system defense planning, which is the subject of this paper,
relevant references are [3,13,26–29].
Brown et al. [3] proposed a general defender-attacker-defender
model to allocate budget-limited defensive resources in any
critical infrastructure including power systems. This model was
Fig. 1. Attacker-defender model.
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outages in an efficient manner. In addition, Benders decomposi-
tion was suggested as a potential solution technique.
Bier et al. [13] presented a heuristic iterative approach to
determine the optimal defense of power system components.
The methodology comprised three nested algorithms correspond-
ing to the agents of a defender-attacker-defender model. The main
drawback of this approach was its reliance on a suboptimal
strategy that identified the most heavily loaded lines as critical.
Holmgren et al. [26] introduced a game theoretical model to
study strategies for defending and protecting electric power
systems subject to different types of antagonistic threats. However,
decisions by the defender and the attacker were both modeled in a
simplified way through the use of continuous variables rather than
binary variables.
Yao et al. [27] first formulated the defense planning problem of
a power system as a trilevel program [30] based on the general
defender-attacker-defender model proposed in [3]. The solution
method consisted in a decomposition-based approach that itera-
tively solved smaller nested bilevel programming problems. How-
ever, these bilevel problems were selected in a non-systematic
sequence and solved by an iterative time-consuming procedure.
Rose [28] addressed the trilevel programming formulation pre-
sented in [27] through a master-subproblem methodology inspired
by the Benders decomposition approach described in [3]. The
solution technique interestingly included a set of cuts in the master
problem based on the underlying rationale of [31] by which defense
schemes should include at least one of the components disrupted in
previous iterations. Despite this relevant feature, this approach was
characterized by several unresolved convergence issues.
The practical relevance and timeliness of power system defense
planning for vulnerability mitigation are both backed by the recent
contribution reported in [29], where the game theoretical work of
[26] was extended by allowing a dynamic interaction among
defenders and attackers.
This paper presents a new optimization-based approach for the
optimal allocation of defensive resources in an electric power grid
so that its vulnerability against multiple contingencies is miti-
gated. Similar to [3,13,27,28], this planning problem is character-
ized by a defender-attacker-defender model wherein optimal
operation of the system under contingency is modeled. The
resulting problem is formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear
trilevel program [30]. The distinctive feature of the proposed
approach with respect to [3,13,27,28] is the application of a two-
stage solution methodology based on mathematical programming.
First, the original trilevel program is transformed into an equiva-
lent mixed-integer bilevel programming problem by replacing the
two lowermost problems with a single-level equivalent. This stage
uses a duality-based transformation previously reported in [32],
that was applied in [10] for an attacker-defender model similar to
the two lowermost optimization levels of the original trilevel
program. Two recent examples of successful application of this
transformation in the context of power systems can be found in
[33,34]. In the second stage, an efficient implicit enumeration
algorithm is applied to the bilevel program derived in the first
stage. The implicit enumeration algorithm was developed by
Scaparra and Church [31] to solve a similar bilevel program for
the protection of a logistic network.
Thus, the main motivation of this paper is to solve the trilevel
model presented in [27] by using the implicit enumeration
algorithm described in [31], for which the duality-based transfor-
mation of [10,32] is applied. It is worth mentioning that collecting
the valuable features of [10,27,31,32] and combining them give
rise to a novel, systematic, and effective solution approach.
The proposed two-stage method presents the following main
advantages over the approaches described in [3,13,27,28]: (i) theconversion to a bilevel programming problem is exact and its
computational burden is moderate, (ii) the implicit enumeration
algorithm implements a systematic and sound solution search
analogous to the branch-and-bound algorithm used in mixed-
integer linear programming [35], and (iii) optimality is guaranteed
in a finite number of steps.
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:1. A tool is developed for the system planner to optimally allocate
defensive resources in order to mitigate the vulnerability of the
electric power grid against multiple contingencies.2. A two-stage approach is proposed to solve the resulting trilevel
programming problem. The methodology is based on the novel
application of a previously reported implicit enumeration
algorithm which guarantees the attainment of globally optimal
solutions.3. Numerical experience is reported from solving case studies
based on the IEEE Reliability Test System and the IEEE 300-bus
system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
highlights the differences between an attacker-defender model
and a defender-attacker-defender model. Section 3 presents the
trilevel formulation of the electric grid defense planning problem.
Section 4 describes the proposed solution methodology. Section 5
provides and discusses some numerical results. Finally, Section 6
draws relevant conclusions.2. Attacker-defender versus defender-attacker-defender
models
Attacker-defender models have been recently used to analyze the
vulnerability of power systems under multiple contingencies [9–19].
These models, also known as interdiction models, characterize a
decision-making problem involving two different agents, namely an
attacker and a defender (Fig. 1). The attacker or disruptive agent
determines the set of out-of-service system components with the
goal of maximizing the system damage and subject to limited
disruptive resources. The defender, which is identified with the
system operator, reacts against the outages determined by the
attacker to minimize the damage inflicted on the system.
Although attacker-defender models are useful in finding critical
components, they do not explicitly determine which components
have to be defended. As explained in [3], defending those
components that are identified as critical by an attacker-defender
model does not necessarily provide the best protection against a
system disruption. Therefore, new models are needed to deter-
mine the optimal defense plan for a power system exposed to
multiple contingencies.
Fig. 2. Defender-attacker-defender model.
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is suitable for the defense planning of critical infrastructures such
as power systems. This model, also referred to as fortification
model, involves three agents acting in sequence (Fig. 2): (i) a
system planner who identifies the system components to be
defended in order to minimize the damage caused by out-of-
service components, (ii) a disruptive agent who determines the
most-damaging set of out-of-service components, and (iii) the
system operator who responds to any disruptive action by means
of some corrective measures to minimize the overall damage.
Each agent optimizes its own objective function subject to the
reaction of the agent of the subsequent level. Thus, the system
planner considers the response of the disruptive agent whereas
the reaction of the system operator is included in the constraint
set of the disruptive agent. Moreover, it is assumed that defensive
and disruptive resources are both limited.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the bilevel attacker-defender model of
Fig. 1 is embedded in the defender-attacker-defender model as the
two lowermost optimization levels. Thus, all feasible combinations
of out-of-service components are implicitly considered.3. Problem formulation
This section presents the mathematical formulation of the
defender-attacker-defender model used for the electric grid
defense planning problem. This formulation is based on the
following modeling assumptions commonly adopted in state-of-
the-art models for both vulnerability analysis and vulnerability
mitigation [2,3,9,11–16,18,23–29]:1. A steady-state security model is used where vulnerability and
criticality are measured in terms of the system load shed, i.e.,
the total amount of involuntary decreases in consumption of
real power.Table 1
Indices.2.j Generator indexA deterministic worst-case analysis is implemented. This is
fundamental to deal with outages with low probability of
occurrence but catastrophic impact on the system.l Transmission asset index3.
m Search tree node index
n Bus indexA static planning model comprising a single period is consid-
ered. During this target period generation sites are known and
a single load scenario is modeled, typically corresponding tothe highest load demand forecast for the considered planning
horizon.4. A dc load flow model is used to characterize the behavior of the
transmission network. This linearized and static model is a
standard and useful simplification in power system planning.
Admittedly, the use of such a simplified model leads to results
that may be optimistic. A complete study of the defense planning
problem would, however, render the problem essentially intract-
able through optimization and would have to be solved by
repeated simulations. These modeling limitations notwithstand-
ing, the solution of the proposed defense planning problem
provides the system planner with a first estimate of the defense
strategies required to mitigate the vulnerability of the system.
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we consider that trans-
mission lines and transformers (which are both characterized by
their series reactance) are the only assets that can be respectively
defended and disrupted by the system planner and the disruptive
agent. However, it should be noted that the proposed approach
can be straightforwardly extended to account for the defense and
disruption of other power system components. Using the notation
presented in Tables 1–5, the optimal allocation of defensive
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Problem (1)–(14) comprises three optimization levels: (i) the
upper level (1)–(3), which is associated with the system planner;
(ii) the middle level (4)–(7), characterizing the behavior of the
disruptive agent; and (iii) the lower level (8)–(14), corresponding
to the system operator. The system planner controls the vector of
binary variables w, which models the defense of the transmission
components. Thus, wl is equal to 1 if transmission asset l is
defended, being 0 otherwise. The disruptive agent controls the
vector of binary variables v, where vl is equal to 0 if transmission
asset l is out of service, being 1 otherwise. Finally, the system
operator controls the vectors of continuous variables Pf, Pg, δ, and
ΔPd. Dual variables associated with the lower-level problem
(8)–(14) are in parentheses.
It should be noted that the middle-level problem is parameter-
ized in terms of the upper-level variables wl. Similarly, the lower-
level problem is parameterized in terms of the middle-level
variables vl. It is also worth mentioning that lower-level decision
variables ΔPdn are present in the objective functions of the upper-
and middle-level optimizations. The asterisk and the apostrophe
in (1), (4), and (8) are used to indicate that ΔPdn are decision
variables of the lower-level problem.
The objective of the system planner is to minimize the damage,
which is expressed as the system load shed (1). Based on
previously reported models on electric grid defense planning
[3,13,27,28], upper-level decision variables wl are binary (2) and
are constrained by resource limitations, which are modeled in aTable 2
Sets.
C Set of candidate components for defense
J Set of indices of generators
Jn Set of indices of generators connected to bus n
L Set of indices of transmission assets
M Set of nodes of the search tree
N Set of indices of buses
W Feasibility set for vector w
Table 3
Constants.
D(l) Destination or receiving bus of transmission asset l
K Number of simultaneous out-of-service transmission assets
O(l) Origin or sending bus of transmission asset l








Capacity of generator j
xl Reactance of transmission asset l
Z Number of transmission assets to be defended




f Power flow of transmission asset l, lth component of vector Pf
pgj Power output of generator j, jth component of vector P
g
vl Binary variable that is equal to 0 if transmission asset l is out of service
and 1 otherwise, lth component of vector v
wl Binary variable that is equal to 1 if transmission asset l is defended and
0 otherwise, lth component of vector w
zbest Optimal system load shed
δn Phase angle at bus n, nth component of vector δ
ΔPdn Load shed at bus n, nth component of vector ΔP
d
compact way by (3). A possible form for expression (3) is [31]:
∑
l∈L
wl ¼ Z; ð15Þ
where constraint (15) is a cardinality expression setting the
number of simultaneously defended transmission assets.
In contrast, the disruptive agent maximizes the system load
shed (4) by disrupting undefended assets (5). Note that constraints
(5) relate upper-level decision variables wl with middle-level
decision variables vl. We assume that if transmission asset l is
defended, i.e., wl¼1, the disruptive agent cannot disable this
component. Hence, the corresponding variable vl is set to 1. In
other words, if a line or a transformer is defended it becomes
invulnerable. Constraint (6) sets the number of transmission assets
that can be simultaneously out of service. Constraints (7) impose
the integrality of variables vl.
The system operator is modeled by the optimal power flow
(8)–(14). The objective of the system operator (8) is to minimize
the system load shed under the combination of out-of-service
transmission assets v chosen by the disruptive agent. Using a dc
network model [8], constraints (9) express the network power
flows in terms of the nodal phase angles and the middle-level
decision variables vl. Note that if transmission asset l is disrupted,
i.e., vl¼0, the corresponding power flow is set to 0. Constraints
(10) represent the power balance at each bus of the system. Upper
and lower bounds on lower-level decision variables are imposed in
constraints (11)–(14).
Problem (1)–(14) is a mixed-integer nonlinear trilevel program-
ming problem. The presence of binary decision variables in the
middle level does not allow obtaining an equivalent single-level
problem [3]. Moreover, the decomposition-based approaches pro-
posed in the technical literature [3,27,28] might present difficul-
ties in attaining optimality within moderate computing times.
These difficulties are associated with (i) the need for solving the
attacker-defender model corresponding to the two lowermost
optimization levels, (ii) the reliance on a master problem of
increasing dimension, and (iii) the lack of a systematic search
process. Thus, exact and efficient solution procedures are yet to be
explored.4. Solution methodology
The proposed solution approach consists of two stages. In the
first stage, the original trilevel programming problem (1)–(14) is
equivalently transformed into a bilevel programming problem. In
the second stage, an effective implicit enumeration algorithm is
applied to the bilevel program resulting from the first stage.Table 5
Dual variables and vectors.
αn Dual variable associated with the upper bound for the load shed at bus n,
nth component of vector α
γ j Dual variable associated with the upper bound for the power output of
generator j, jth component of vector γ
λn Dual variable associated with the power balance equation at bus n, nth
component of vector λ
μl Dual variable associated with the equation relating power flow and phase
angles for transmission asset l, lth component of vector μ
ϕ
l
Dual variable associated with the lower bound for the power flow of
transmission asset l, lth component of vector ϕ
ϕ l Dual variable associated with the upper bound for the power flow of
transmission asset l, lth component of vector ϕ
χ
n
Dual variable associated with the lower bound for the phase angle at bus n,
nth component of vector χ
χ n Dual variable associated with the upper bound for the phase angle at bus n,
nth component of vector χ
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Using the methodology described in [10,32], the max-min
problem comprising the middle- and lower-level optimizations
(4)–(14) can be equivalently recast as a single-level problem. This
transformation consists in replacing the lower-level problem by its
dual thereby converting the max-min problem into a max-max
problem, i.e., a single-level maximization. Therefore, the original
trilevel problem (1)–(14) is transformed into the following equiva-
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The upper-level problem (16)–(18) is identical to the upper-
level problem (1)–(3) of the original trilevel program.
The lower-level problem (19)–(32) of the bilevel equivalent is
associated with the two lowermost levels (4)–(14) of the original
trilevel program. According to the strong duality theorem [35], the
objective function (19) is equal to the dual lower-level objective
function. Constraints (20)–(22) are identical to (5)–(7), respec-
tively. The remaining constraints comprise the dual feasibility
constraints (23)–(32) of the original lower-level problem
(8)–(14). Nonlinear expressions (25) involving the product ofbinary variables and continuous variables are subsequently trans-
formed into linear expressions using some well-known integer
algebra results [36]. Further details on this equivalent transforma-
tion can be found in [10,32].
4.2. Stage 2: Implicit enumeration algorithm
Similar to problem (1)–(14), the binary nature of lower-level
decision variables vl in the bilevel problem (16)–(32) resulting from
the first stage requires the use of alternative solution approaches.
Scaparra and Church [31] derived an implicit enumeration algo-
rithm for a bilevel programming problem associated with the
defense planning of a logistic network, whose structure is essen-
tially identical to that of problem (16)–(32). Therefore, the findings
by Scaparra and Church are straightforwardly applicable here.
The implicit enumeration algorithm explores a search tree
based on the following premise: the optimal set of defended
components selected by the system planner must include at least
one of the critical assets identified by the disruptive agent when
no component is defended. It should be noted that if none of the
critical assets is defended then the disruptive agent would disable
this critical set and the worst-case interdiction would not be
prevented by the defense plan selected by the system planner.
Due to their analogies, the implicit enumeration algorithm
borrows the terminology from the branch-and-bound algorithm
for mixed-integer linear programming [35]. The algorithm starts at
the root node of the search tree by solving the lower-level problem
(19)–(32) with no defended transmission assets. The optimal dis-
ruption plan represents the set of candidate components to be
defended associated with the root node. Based on the aforemen-
tioned premise, the system planner must then harden at least one
of these assets. This is implemented by a process referred to as
branching by which new nodes are created according to the new
defense plans resulting from the solution to problem (19)–(32) in
the parent nodes. Branching is implemented until either defensive
resource limitations (18) can no longer be met or no more candidate
components are available for defense, being the corresponding
node denoted as a leaf. The implicit enumeration algorithm is
stopped when all nodes are leaves. The optimal solution is the
feasible defense plan with the lowest value of the upper-level
objective function (16).
The proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 3 and works as
follows:1. Initialization: Initialize the node set M with the root node
associated with the undefended network, i.e., wð0Þl ¼ 0;∀l∈L,
and set the optimal system load shed zbest ¼1.2. Node processing: Select and remove a nodem fromM. If nodem is
the root node or it was created from setting any wl to 1 then solve
its associated lower-level problem (19)–(32) for the corresponding
vector wðmÞ, thus yielding vðmÞ and ∑n∈NΔPd
ðmÞ
n . Those assets l with
vðmÞl ¼ 0 constitute the set of candidate components for defense
CðmÞ. If ∑n∈NΔPd
ðmÞ
n ozbest then the solution is stored as the optimal
solution and zbest ¼∑n∈NΔPd
ðmÞ
n .
If node m was created from setting any wl to 0 then candidate
components for defense at the parent node except transmission
asset l constitute CðmÞ.3. Pruning: If the set of defended assets cannot be further
expanded without violating (18) or CðmÞ is empty then go to
step 5 since node m becomes a leaf.4. Branching: Choose an element l from the set of candidate
components for defense CðmÞ and create two new nodes. In
one node, transmission asset l is hardened, i.e., the vector of
defended assets w is updated by setting wl¼1. In the other
node, asset l is not hardened, i.e., wl¼0. Add the newly created
nodes to the node set M.
Fig. 3. Flowchart of the implicit enumeration algorithm.
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algorithm with the optimal solution; otherwise, go to step 2.
Similar to the branch-and-bound algorithm, the implicit enu-
meration provides a systematic search that guarantees optimality
in a finite number of node evaluations. As shown in [31] for the
case of defensive resource limitations (18) adopting the cardinality
form of (15), the upper bound for the number of node evaluations
is ðKZþ1−1Þ=ðK−1Þ, which does not depend on the system size and








It is worth mentioning that step 2 is suitable for parallel
implementation, thereby leading to significant computational
savings. This step also lends itself to depth-first and breadth-first
search strategies analogous to those used in the branch-and-
bound algorithm, which may yield additional computational
improvement. Moreover, the optimal solution to problem (19)–
(32) at the parent node might be used as a starting solution for the
evaluation at the next branching level. Note, however, that these
implementation details, although constituting distinctive features
over [3,27,28], are beyond the scope of this paper.Table 6
Case RTS1. Impact of defense planning on vulnerability.
K System load shed without defense (MW) System load shed reduction (%)
Z
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 – – – – –
2 194 29.9 61.9 63.4 97.4 97.4
3 309 31.4 37.2 41.7 44.7 56.0
4 516 25.0 33.7 37.6 40.1 51.9
5 842 23.0 26.7 46.8 49.8 62.0
6 1017 19.1 39.3 50.5 55.1 56.5
7 1017 14.3 21.5 37.2 39.3 49.8
8 1198 12.6 20.1 38.9 45.7 49.7
9 1373 17.6 30.3 40.1 47.2 55.4
10 1373 12.7 25.1 35.0 44.3 47.1
11 1428 9.5 25.5 34.2 38.6 47.5
12 1468 8.7 19.8 30.5 39.2 45.45. Numerical results
This section presents results from three case studies. First, two
test cases based on the IEEE Reliability Test System [37] are
analyzed, namely, the One Area RTS-96 (RTS1) and the Two Area
RTS-96 (RTS2). The IEEE Reliability Test System is widely adopted
as a benchmark in the literature related to power system vulner-
ability [2,3,9,11–19,23–29] since it allows both reproducibility and
a comprehensive analysis of the results. The load profile corre-
sponds to a winter weekday at 18:00. Circuits sharing the same
towers are treated as independent lines, e.g., line 20-23 has two
circuits: 20-23A and 20-23B.
In order to assess the scalability of the proposed approach, a
case study based on the IEEE 300-bus system [38] has also been
analyzed. This system comprises 411 transmission assets, 69
generating units, and 191 demands.
For illustration purposes, expression (18) has been modeled as
the cardinality constraint (15). Defense schemes of up to5 components and disruption plans comprising up to 12 transmis-
sion assets have been considered. In all of the simulations δ has
been set to π=2 rad.
The proposed two-stage algorithm was implemented on a Sun
Fire X4140 X64 with 2 processors at 2.30 GHz and 8 GB of RAM
using MATLAB [39]. The optimization problems were solved with
CPLEX 11.2 [40] under GAMS 23.0 [41].
5.1. Case RTS1
Table 6 provides information on optimal vulnerability levels
attained by the two-stage algorithm for case RTS1. The second
column lists the maximum levels of damage for the undefended
system, i.e., for Z¼0. Note that at least two out-of-service assets,
i.e., K¼2, are required to cause load shedding. Columns 3–7 list the
percent vulnerability reduction over the undefended case when
hardening is implemented.
As can be seen, the defense of transmission assets is an
effective action for vulnerability mitigation since it significantly
reduces the maximum damage associated with multiple contin-
gencies. For example, when five components are defended, i.e.,
Z¼5, vulnerability drops between 97.4% for K¼2 and 45.4% for
K¼12.
Moreover, the proposed approach provides the system planner
with valuable information on the compliance with a deterministic
N-K security criterion, which is the standard in industry practice
for values of K equal to 1 or 2 [8]. As shown in Table 6, the test
system meets the N-1 criterion with no need for defense, whereas
hardening four components practically ensures the N-2 security
criterion. Note that higher values of K require the allocation of
further defensive resources.
Table 6 is also useful to analyze the tradeoff between the
defense cost incurred by adding defensive resources and the gain
in vulnerability mitigation. Most of the defense benefit is achieved
with a maximum of three defended assets, since they contribute
more than 50% of the overall improvement. In contrast, larger
defense investments produce progressively lower vulnerability
reductions.
The case characterized by K¼4 and Z¼4 is relevant to motivate
the need for a defender-attacker-defender model since it illus-
trates the suboptimality of defending critical transmission assets
as determined by an attacker-defender model [3]. For K¼4, the
optimal solution provided by an attacker-defender model [12]
identifies two sets of critical transmission assets whose disruption
yields a maximum vulnerability level of 516 MW: (i) 3-24, 12-23,
13-23, and 14-16, and (ii) 12-23, 13-23, 14-16, and 15-24. The
defense of either of those critical sets would yield a maximum
N. Alguacil et al. / Computers & Operations Research 41 (2014) 282–290288level of system load shed equal to 387 MW, i.e., a 25.0% vulner-
ability reduction. Both suboptimal defense plans are shown in
Fig. 4. In contrast, the optimal four-asset defense plan against any
combination of four disrupted transmission components includes
the hardening of assets 7-8, 10-12, 12-23, and 14-16, as depicted in
Fig. 4. With this defense scheme, the maximum damage inflicted
on the protected system is equal to 309 MW thereby leading to a
40.1% reduction in the vulnerability level (Table 6). In other words,
the optimal solution to the defense planning problem significantly
improves upon the intuitive solutions by 25.2%.
The average computing time required to achieve the optimal
solutions to all simulations was 3.9 min. In order to assess the
performance of the proposed approach we have implemented the
method reported in [27]. For K¼1 and K¼2, the approach proposed
by Yao et al. performed similar to the proposed two-stage method.
However, for values of K exceeding 2 the algorithm of [27] was
unable to find the optimal solution within 20 000 s. These results
substantiate the superiority of the proposed two-stage approach.
5.2. Case RTS2
The optimal results for case RTS2 are listed in Table 7. As can be
observed, the mitigation of vulnerability for a specific value of Z
generally reaches a lower level than that for case RTS1 due to the
larger size of the test system. Notwithstanding, it should be notedFig. 4. Case RTS1. Defense pthat significant vulnerability reductions are achieved by defending
a relatively low number of transmission assets.
The average computing time for the simulations of this case
was 19.6 min, which represents a moderate computational effort,
bearing in mind that a planning problem is solved. Similar to case
RTS1, the available tool described in [27] failed to efficiently
address this medium-sized test system, thus corroborating that
the proposed methodology is a superior approach.5.3. Case based on the IEEE 300-bus system
The optimal results for the case based on the IEEE 300-bus system
are listed in Table 8. Unlike cases RTS1 and RTS2, disrupting a single
transmission asset yields load shedding due to the presence of radial
areas within the system, which are highly vulnerable. Note also that,
as expected, the larger size of this system leads to lower levels of
vulnerability reduction for the same amount of defensive resources.
As can be seen, for Z¼5, vulnerability is reduced by factors ranging
between 0.71% for K¼1 and 8.38% for K¼12.
The average computing time required to attain optimality for
this larger case study was 35.3 min. Therefore, the associated
computational effort is still moderate within the context of power
system planning.lans for Z¼4 and K¼4.
Table 7
Case RTS2. Impact of defense planning on vulnerability.
K System load shed without defense (MW) System load shed reduction (%)
Z
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 – – – – –
2 194 0.0 29.9 29.9 61.9 61.9
3 309 0.0 37.2 37.2 41.7 44.7
4 442 8.1 22.6 30.1 30.1 38.5
5 842 20.8 23.0 38.6 43.8 43.8
6 1017 17.2 19.1 36.3 37.5 39.2
7 1036 1.8 18.7 20.6 29.7 35.6
8 1211 14.5 16.0 25.4 27.9 32.9
9 1373 11.8 17.6 23.7 25.9 32.6
10 1684 11.5 23.0 28.3 32.8 40.3
11 1859 10.4 21.5 29.3 34.9 39.8
12 1859 7.8 15.9 19.9 28.7 33.6
Table 8
Case based on the IEEE 300-bus system. Impact of defense planning on
vulnerability.
K System load shed without defense (MW) System load shed reduction (%)
Z
1 2 3 4 5
1 8071.3 0.03 0.15 0.53 0.64 0.71
2 8368.9 0.35 0.63 1.15 1.34 1.64
3 8613.9 0.20 0.99 1.43 1.56 2.03
4 8883.1 0.46 1.05 1.85 2.29 2.72
5 9128.3 0.88 1.23 2.19 2.63 3.15
6 9396.6 0.79 1.91 2.60 3.09 3.79
7 9653.9 1.07 2.18 2.54 3.78 4.59
8 9889.1 0.85 1.68 2.91 4.18 5.21
9 10 146.1 1.05 2.13 3.56 4.64 6.08
10 10 439.5 1.13 2.81 4.38 5.45 7.12
11 10 721.1 1.71 3.49 5.04 6.36 8.03
12 10 937.8 1.83 3.58 5.17 6.73 8.38
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This paper has presented a new approach for the optimal
allocation of defensive resources in an electric power grid to
mitigate the vulnerability against multiple contingencies. This
planning problem is formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear
trilevel program for which no efficient solution procedures are
available in the technical literature. We have developed a novel
two-stage methodology that attains global optimality in finite time.
The first stage transforms the original trilevel program into an
equivalent bilevel programming problem. The second stage subse-
quently solves the resulting bilevel program through the application
of an implicit enumeration algorithm similar to the branch-and-
bound algorithm used in mixed-integer linear programming.
The new procedure was successfully tested on cases based on
the IEEE Reliability Test System and the IEEE 300-bus system.
Numerical results show that the proposed tool is a useful instru-
ment for the system planner to identify optimal defense strategies
to mitigate the vulnerability against multiple contingencies. Simu-
lations also reveal the effective performance of the proposed
approach and its superiority over previously reported methods.
Although computational issues are not a primary concern in
this kind of planning problems, we recognize that the proposed
approach may be computationally expensive for a large power
system. Further work will examine the computational savings that
may be gained from the parallel implementation of the implicitenumeration algorithm, the consideration of effective strategies
for exploring the search tree, and the use of appropriate initializa-
tion schemes in the evaluation of the tree nodes.
Moreover, this method could be extended to address additional
complexities of power systems such as reactive power, stability
issues, and cascading power failures.
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